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Abstract 
 
Poor and insufficient school infrastructure negatively impacts student learning and 
schooling outcomes. Myriad factors have contributed to an infrastructure gap in the 
education sector in many countries – rapid increases in enrolments, poor maintenance and 
aging capital stocks, rural to urban migration, and inefficient government planning and 
school construction to name a few. Various forms of decentralization are likely to be 
involved both to improve governance and accountability and to foster innovation and cost 
saving in the school construction industry and investment and project cycle.  
 
This paper first discusses why the topic is interesting and worth considering; next we lay 
out the issues and considerations specific to educational infrastructure decentralization; 
we then connect the discussion to the broader infrastructure discussions in the other 
papers as well as to the education decentralization literature. We examine an illustrative 
case study in Egypt exemplifying both the typical centralization of a national school 
construction authority, and the reasons for countries to consider certain kinds of 
decentralization. The case also highlights that school construction reforms involving 
potential decentralization are a long slog dominated and driven by politics. We provide a 
framework for un-packaging and considering key components of the processes involved 
in service provision and some promising strategies relating to decentralization. We 
conclude with some insights for practitioners and others interested in advancing 
knowledge of the topic. 
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Introduction: The Potential Importance of Decentralization, Accountability and 
Educational Infrastructure 
 
Poor and insufficient school infrastructure negatively impact student learning and 
schooling outcomes. Myriad factors have contributed to an infrastructure gap in the 
education sector in many countries – rapid increases in enrolments, poor 
maintenance and aging capital stocks, rural to urban migration, and inefficient 
government planning and school construction to name a few. By some estimates, as 
many as 10 million classrooms and $100 billion in infrastructure investment are 
needed just to support the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs);1 which means, the overall global challenges are far bigger.2  Meeting the 
challenges may require increased funding, but it will also require improved 
efficiency of infrastructure provision. Various forms of decentralization are likely to 
be involved both to improve governance and accountability and to foster innovation 
and cost saving in the school construction industry and investment and project 
cycle.  
 
Over the past three decades plus, a great deal has been written about infrastructure 
decentralization, and nearly as much about educational decentralization. Very little, 
however, has been written on decentralization issues pertaining specifically to 
educational infrastructure and school construction – and even less in developing 
country contexts. This paper first discusses why the topic is interesting and worth 
considering; next we lay out the issues and considerations specific to educational 
infrastructure decentralization; we then connect the discussion to the broader 
infrastructure discussions in the other papers as well as to the education 
decentralization literature. We examine an illustrative case study in Egypt 
exemplifying both the typical centralization of a national school construction 
authority, and the reasons for countries to consider certain kinds of 
decentralization. The case also highlights that school construction reforms involving 
potential decentralization are a long slog dominated and driven by politics.  We 
review and highlight the results of a rare, detailed study in Sub-Saharan Africa. We 
conclude with some insights for practitioners and others interested in advancing 
knowledge of the topic. 
 
We are not able to conclude under what circumstances and conditions 
infrastructure responsibilities should be assigned to different levels of governance. 
We argue that this critical question should be on the research agenda of the 
development community and we discuss how educational infrastructure 
decentralization might be different from recurrent expenditures. In addition, the 
                                                        
1 Source: TI-UP.org Delivering Cost Effective and Sustainable School Infrastructure. (Bonner et al, n.d.) 
2  And the infrastructure issues extend well beyond classroom construction. In fact, classroom 
construction may only be about 60% of investment costs; the non-classroom infrastructure 
associated with school construction include water and sanitation, furniture, ICT, and office space for 
administration. Theunynck  (2009). 
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very significant role of education (and school construction specifically)  in sub-
national budgets in the U.S. and Europe suggests considerable scope for expansion 
in developing world.  We suggest some key areas where the interactions between 
recurrent and capital expenditures are likely to be important. Most infrastructure 
decisions are a mix of central, regional, local, community, and/or private 
actors.  That makes any categorization even more complicated, and one objective of 
the paper is to provide a framework for un-packaging and considering key 
components of the processes involved in service provision and some promising 
strategies relating to decentralization. 
 
The sparse literature on educational infrastructure decentralization is surprising 
given the magnitude of the needs, the clearly distinctive issues involved in 
educational infrastructure compared to other sectors, and the extent of 
centralization found in many countries. The financial scope is bigger than implied by 
capital expenditure figures because, like much “point” infrastructure associated 
with service provision, there is strong interplay between current service provision, 
on the one hand, and capital investment and school construction, on the other. As 
but one example, once built, schools must have teachers whose salaries are the most 
significant recurrent expenditures in many government budgets. 
 
In addition, while it may seem obvious, it is worth stating explicitly that there are 
many reasons why, and modes through which, school infrastructure is related to 
student outcomes and performance. To highlight just a few:  
 
 School proximity to home impacts attendance—travel and safety;  
 The quality of infrastructure impacts enrolment and completion rates, 
learning outcomes as well as teacher absenteeism (This is particularly true 
for water and sanitation facilities). 
 It is also very important to parental perception and satisfaction with school 
quality, and therefore is (or should be) an important feature of politicians’ 
calculus. 
In addition, while investment expenditures represent a small share of the total (for 
instance when compared to health sector expenditures), there are several factors 
that compound the fiscal impact of educational infrastructure investments. Perhaps 
the most important factor is that infrastructure investments have an impact over 
teacher and payroll costs, which make up by far the lion’s share of education 
expenditures. In addition to the impact on teacher effectiveness mentioned above, 
every school construction project implies an allocation of teachers to school 
buildings. 
Thus, the topic of educational infrastructure and decentralization is an important 
one to the extent there is promise for cost reduction and other improvements in 
efficiency. In addition, during the so called “massification” of educational access—
periods in which a country is pushing to vastly expand enrolment quickly, 
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centralization may indeed be successful. As reforms become more complicated, 
more about effectiveness, efficiency and quality, the need to decentralize is likely to 
increase. Urbanization has also contributed to these needs. Indeed, many if not most 
countries now find and least part of their education system at such stages of 
development, making the topic even more timely. 
 
Educational Capital Investment, Sources & Uses of Funds & Locus of Decision-making 
 
Before developing and then applying a decentralization typology specifically to 
school construction issues and the stakeholders most often connected to it, it is 
instructive to consider the level of capital spending in the education sector across  
and within countries. There are wide variations between countries in capital 
expenditure. Figure 1 shows capital expenditures in basic education as a proportion 
of the total education budget for a selection of countries for 2009.  Clearly the 
expenditure effort is greatly varied across countries.  The OECD average (not 
shown) is approximately 9%.  
 
FIGURE 1 : Primary and Secondary Educational Capital expenditure,  
% of total public educational expenditure, Selected Countries, 2009  
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from EdStats (2009, except where indicated by 08). ISCED 1,2,3, & 4 
 
 
There are no clearly discernable patterns, and an additional analysis that ordered 
the countries by various broad measures of decentralization, yielded no 
relationship.3 One surprising observation is the rather low level of educational 
                                                        
3 We used data on subnational government expenditures as a proportion of total government 
expenditures for 2009 or the most recent year available (cash or accrual basis) as an index for fiscal 
decentralization. We lose five countries from the sample in the figure, and we observe no pattern. 
There are very few countries reporting subnational educational expenditure as a proportion of total 
educational expenditure so we are unable to use an education-specific fiscal decentralization index. 
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capital investment from the large federal states in Latin America: Brazil, Mexico, and 
Argentina.  Where as some of the more recently decentralized countries like Peru 
are quite high, perhaps because of new investments being channeled through 
subnational governments, which often happens during early stages of 
decentralization.  
 
Figure 2 shows that in some cases expenditures vary a great deal from year to year. 
But appear steady over time in others, and that this is true both in countries where 
spending is high and those where it is lower. 4 
 
Of course, these figures tell us nothing about the level of government (or school) 
responsible for which components of the capital investment. Very little information 
exists to allow legitimate comparisons across countries. However, we were able to 
use the locus of decision-making framework in OECD’s Education at a Glance to 
examine the range of centralization and decentralization in a sample of countries—
some of which are considered emerging or developing—albeit that the survey only 
covers a small part of the universe of decisions relevant to educational capital 
investment (See Annex 1).  
 
Mexico, for example, appears highly centralized with respect to capital 
expenditures, despite significant decentralization in the provision of education 
services over the past three decades. The central government alone allocated 
school-level capital expenditures and decides how they are spent.  On the other 
hand, Mexican states do have autonomy over the decision to create or close a school. 
The high level of decentralization regarding these three decisions in Chile is 
consistent with the educational reforms there over the past three decades. With the 
exception of the Slovak Republic, the ECA countries all appear decentralized with 
some like Hungary even requiring school-level consultation on capital spending 
decisions. 
 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                     
The results are available upon request from the author. The data for the index was take from the 
World Bank’s fiscal decentralization web page: www.worldbank.org/publicfinance/decentralization 
4 One reviewer questioned the credibility of the data on Bangladesh, given that the capital 
expenditure appears so high. Given that these data come directly from EdStats, and that it is beyond 
the scope of this study to verify the accuracy of such broadly-used data sources, it will suffice to note 
that spending levels in Bangaldesh are likely high and steady, even if the precise numbers must be 
used with caution. 
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FIGURE 2 : Primary and Secondary Educational Capital expenditure,  
% of total public educational expenditure, Selected Countries, 2007-2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Connecting Educational Infrastructure and School Construction to the 
Decentralization and Accountability Literature 
 
While the traditional education decentralization literature focuses, almost 
exclusively on service provision (recurrent expenditure), the typologies of 
decentralization and accountability developed in this literature are largely relevant 
to the discussion of infrastructure provision. For instance, we should distinguish 
between “Decentralization to Sub-national Governments” and “Decentralization to 
Schools” (most commonly School Based Management (SBM), school autonomy, 
community and parental involvement, school choice, client power, etc).  
 
While distinct, the two forms of educational decentralization are not mutually 
exclusive and are often intertwined in reform processes. Rondinelli’s classic 
framework is clearly relevant regarding Deconcentration, Delegation, Devolution, 
Privatization.5 
                                                        
5 Rondinelli (1981, 1986, & 1989) created the original basic vocabulary for describing the various ways 
in which governments may be expected to pursue administrative decentralization. It is important to note 
that very rarely can any given reform be given one single label. That is, any reform is likely to be a 
complex combination of each of these sets of  arrangements.. Accountability for the results of decisions 
remains largely bureaucratic, vertical, and internal to the executive branch, but sub-national entities can 
make decisions and report ex-post on the decision or the results of the decisions.  1) Deconcentration 
involves the central or federal government granting greater authority to its own sub-national authorities 
Source: Author’s calculations from EdStats. ISCED 1,2,3, & 4 
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Table 1:  Education Infrastructure Decentralization Matrix 
Education Administrative Fiscal Political 
Deconcentration 
to Regional 
Government 
Offices and 
Regional MOE 
Offices 
Move managerial 
decisions and managerial 
accountability to   
regional offices of central 
government and MOE. 
Give regional managers 
greater authority to 
allocate and reallocate 
budgets. 
Create regional, elected 
bodies to advise regional 
managers. 
Devolution to 
regional or local 
governments 
Education sector 
managers are appointed 
by elected officials at 
local or regional level. 
Give subnational 
governments power to 
allocate education 
spending and, in some 
cases, to determine 
spending levels (i.e., 
through raising 
revenues). 
Elected regional or local 
officials of general 
purpose governments are 
ultimately accountable 
both to voters and to 
sources of finance for the 
delivery of schooling. 
Delegation 
(and/or 
Devolution) to 
schools and/or 
school councils 
School principals and/or 
school councils 
empowered to make 
personnel, curriculum, 
and some spending 
decisions. 
School principals and/or 
school councils receive 
government funding and 
can allocate spending and 
raise revenues. 
School councils are 
elected or appointed, 
often with power to name 
school principals.   
Delegation to 
NGOs, Contract 
Management 
Agencies (CMAs) 
and/or Social 
Funds 
Government responsible 
for provision, but 
delegates operational 
autonomy to implement 
large-scale small 
construction programs, to 
be carried out by small 
contractors with local 
labor. 
Funds provided by 
government (central, 
regional local, perhaps 
with community input) 
but handles largely by 
delegated agencies. Cost 
savings in some cases. 
Elected officials of 
general purpose 
governments are, ideally, 
ultimately accountable to 
voters and to sources of 
finance for the delivery of 
schooling. How this 
works in practice is key. 
Agencies may buffer 
officials 
Implicit 
delegation to 
community 
schools and 
community based 
approaches 
School principals and/or 
community school 
councils make key 
decisions. 
Some self-financing or 
local inputs with some 
government subsidies, 
especially in remote 
areas where public 
schools are not present. 
School councils are often 
popularly elected. 
Government is still 
usually responsible for 
service provision, though 
not the direct provider. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
under its direct control. It is the weakest form of decentralization for it does not transfer any significant 
authority to sub-national governments. 2) Delegation involves creating semi-autonomous agencies, such 
as state-owned enterprises or public corporations. 3) Devolution entails the transfer of service delivery 
responsibility to independent sub-national levels of government, regions, provinces, municipalities, etc.; 
Accountability is now horizontal and takes place, to some degree, between the local executive and the 
local representative branches of government 4) Privatization is often considered the most far-reaching 
form of decentralization. Early studies focused on fiscal decentralization; that is, the decentralization of 
functions related to public finance and public financial management. Fiscal decentralization can be 
further divided into two broad categories: 1) revenue-side fiscal decentralization, which involves 
granting sub-national levels of government greater control over tax and other revenue sources, and 2) 
expenditure-side fiscal decentralization, which involves greater expenditure responsibility on the part of 
sub-national governments. Revenue-side fiscal decentralization almost always includes expenditure-side 
fiscal decentralization; however, the latter may take place without the former, with the central 
government usually transferring financial resources to sub-national governments via grants or revenue 
sharing schemes. Again, nearly all reforms exhibits aspects of several of these trends. 
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Gershberg and Winkler (2004) adapted this typology to education, and we present it 
here in Table 1, with slight adaptations to highlight the relevance for infrastructure 
provision. Naturally, this is a gross oversimplification. For instance, each “cell” of the 
table could be further subdivided into at least four cells to delineate school design, 
school location, school construction, and school maintenance, as we discuss later.6 
In addition, it is not particularly useful  (or even correct) to try to attach any one of  
these decentralization  “types” to any given reform. Rather, it is important to 
understand how performance accountability works, or is intended to work, and 
these concepts are likely to be useful in identifying how accountability flows 
through the system. Any given reform will indeed be a complex combination of each 
of these “types.” 
 
Of course, the regulations and laws relating to any particular aspect usually differ in 
important ways from the rules of the game in practice. For instance, with 
administrative deconcentration, while there may be some managerial decision 
making transferred to local offices of central agencies, this is often coupled with ex-
post accountability upwards, at least for results. 7   
 
Before proceeding to consider capital expenditures and school construction 
explicitly, it is worth reviewing the potential (theoretical) gains and drawbacks of 
decentralization, as well as what Gershberg and Jacobs (1998) aptly called 
recentralization because of the need to consider the interplay and changing nature 
of the role of the center during so-called decentralization:  
 
“[D]isaggregating the different aspects of accountability … makes clear that, in many respects, 
the expected improvement [from decentralization] requires both greater autonomy for the local 
service provider, and also strengthened performance of some central functions. We refer to this 
necessary strengthening of central functions as recentralization.” Gershberg & Jacobs (1998) 
 
Table 2 summarizes the arguments for and the attributes of decentralization and 
recentralization.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
6 Policy makers involved in such reform processes would benefit from such an efforts specific to their 
country and regional contexts.  
7 An example might be when a district manager can decide what type of automobiles to buy for the 
district office, but if he is found to have broken rules, or the cars turn out to be poor quality or poor 
choices, the district managers are accountable upwards back to the home office. Another way to 
categorize reforms within this typology is the extent to which different components of 
decentralization may be conceived as horizontal or vertical. In the case of administrative devolution 
or the political aspects of delegation to schools, the accountability becomes horizontal. To me this is 
the key issue: whether accountability becomes more horizontal (devolution) or stays vertical 
(deconcentration). 
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Table 2: Arguments for and against decentralization and recentralization 
 
Adapted from Gershberg and Jacobs (1998) 
 
  
 
Key Stakeholders and Institutional Actors in School Construction 
 
Many, and probably most developing countries, have a central School Construction 
Authority (SCA) of some kind. In developed countries, each local school district 
(especially in large cities) may have it’s own local SCA. The other stakeholders and 
institutional actors are similar to those of interest in any discussion of 
decentralization of service provision. 
 
 Central School Construction Authority (SCA) 
o The SCA May or may not be part of MOE (e.g. may be located in the 
Ministry of Planning or Public Works) 
o The SCA May or may not be semi-autonomous even within MOE (i.e., it 
may have its own administrative structure and the Minister may not 
have full authority over it. 
10 International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series 
 
 
 Other ministries (planning, local development, finance, transport/roads, etc): 
for instance, in many countries the ministry responsible for civil works takes 
on the actual construction of schools. 
 Sub-national governments 
 Quasi-public authorities, Social Funds, Contract Management Agencies, etc.  
 Community and School level stakeholders 
 Intermediary and other NGOs 
 Private Sector (construction companies, Public Private Partnerships (PPPs), 
bond and other capital markets 
 
Each of these stakeholders will be discussed in the following sections about phases 
and taxonomies for educational infrastructure. It is instructive to note that there are 
many potential institutions and stakeholders (most likely well over 10 in any given 
country context) and that sub-national governments—often the focus of 
decentralization reforms—are only one among many others. 
 
 
Components of Educational Infrastructure Provision That May Be Decentralized, or 
Not 
 
While there is considerable heterogeneity, school construction generally has key 
components, each of which may or may not be undertaken or managed in a 
centralized or decentralized manner.  Note that while these components are in some 
sense sequential “phases” conceptually, there is often considerable overlap and 
iteration between them in practice.  
 
1. School Design. Usually at the very least, there are minimum design and 
construction standards that are set at the central government level. 8 These 
involve a range of issues of central concern: safety, equity, efficiency and may 
also be connected to pedagogy (for instance if the MOE is transitioning to an 
open classroom setting for constructivist teaching methods).  However, it is 
not uncommon for many if not most aspects of school design to be controlled 
centrally—including building and floor plans, construction methods and 
materials. It is, thus, not uncommon to find school design nearly uniform 
throughout even very geographically diverse countries.9  
 
2. School Location. Whatever level of government is responsible for access to 
schooling is likely to play a strong role in the decision about where new 
schools will be located or existing schools expanded. This is true even if that 
                                                        
8 There are examples where such standards are set at the local or regional level, but in the developing 
world they appear to be rare. In addition, donor projects may be exempt from these standards and 
have their own.  
9 This author first experienced the homogeneity of rural school design resulting from centralization, 
despite tremendous geographic heterogeneity in Mexico in the early 1990s—where school materials 
and design were the same whether in the high sierra or the coastal plains.  
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level of government does not actually provides schooling services. Thus, school 
location, school expansion, school creation, and school closure decisions tend 
to me more centralized than other aspects of a system. Where increasing 
enrolment is a chief concern (e.g., in countries seeking to achieve the education 
MDGs), the central government has an interest in how to maximize national 
enrollments (often resulting in a rural bias). Equity is also key concern as are 
efficiency, scale economies, and cost containment—all of which, at least in 
theory, have aspects that benefit from centralized provision.  On the other 
hand, these valid concerns for some degree of centralism could also be 
addressed in a more decentralized system via funding formulas and grants, 
thus leave more of the key decisions to the more local body.10 Namely, 
weighting central funding formula, regional targeting policy and priorities to 
provinces or regions with significant disadvantaged populations (e.g., out of 
school children, or over-crowding, etc.).   
 
Land acquisition is also a major issue, since the “ideal” location for a school 
from a planning perspective may not contain land owned by the government 
for the purpose. Land acquisition issues are particularly challenging in urban 
areas where vacant land is scarce and it is difficult to procure plots large 
enough to fulfill centralized design and construction standards. Governments 
are often reticent, or bureaucratically challenged, to make heavy use of rental 
and other non-traditional space in urban areas.  In fact, increased urbanization 
has likely enhanced the need to explore and achieve various kinds of 
decentralization. Finally,  school consolidation is a major concern in the ECA 
countries, thus involving school closure more than school construction.  
 
School Staffing, Student Allocation, and Opening the School are also important 
considerations. It may seem almost tautological, but at some point, the school 
needs to open and teachers, administrators, and other non-teaching staff will 
need to be assigned to the new school; students need to be assigned to the 
school, and the school has to function. While this may not typically be 
considered a phase of school construction per se, it is clear that the capital 
investments and recurrent costs mutually affect each other. Thus, 
infrastructure investments must be coordinated with personnel policies and 
vice versa, and capital investments directly impact the recurrent budget going 
forward. In practice, the decision to approve a major school infrastructure 
project is usually preconditioned on the determination of need based on how 
many students will be served. This student count determines staffing, and thus 
the overall level of personnel costs would be built into the recurrent budget in 
the either before or while the project is being proposed and appraised. Finally, 
the deployment of teachers and other staff would follow normal personnel 
                                                        
10 Below we discuss the connection of infrastructure provision with school staffing. Here, it is worth 
noting that any compensatory funding formula policy is likely to have some impact on  teacher-
student ratios—either indirectly or even directly if class size is used as a weight or criteria for 
funding allocation.. 
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procedures and needs to be timed so that they are in place when the school 
opens. 
 
3. School Construction (including new schools and expansions of existing 
schools). The entity that actually takes on the school construction project and 
oversees construction can range from the central SCA to the local school 
district. And as discussed later, the various components of the process can be 
broken down and taken on by different levels of government.  There may be 
some economies of scale from centralization (e.g., in the purchase of inputs like 
cement), but there is also plenty of experience to indicate that centralized 
procurement may foster corruption (Theunynck  2002, 2009; DfID 2012)). 
Nor, has prefabricated construction has not generally succeeded. There may be 
advantages to leveraging local labor, knowledge, materials, and other inputs. 
Therefore, a priori, it is not possible to determine the “correct” level of 
government for each component of school construction.  
 
4. Provision of Non-Infrastructure durable goods. These include furniture, 
equipment and other capital costs associated with school construction. In 
addition, school staffing formulas and other standardized costs have significant 
recurrent cost implications for the education system, and because it is highly 
likely that different levels of government will be responsible for each, this 
highly complicates any decentralization reform efforts compared to network 
infrastructure (such as roads, water, etc). And, even if these costs are, like 
staffing costs, determined according to norms or formulas, the provision of 
these goods need not be done by the same level of government as the 
construction project. For instance, a municipality could build a school but 
furniture could be central procured for cost savings. 
 
5. Maintenance (both routine and major rehabilitation): All infrastructure and 
school construction has associated implications for on-going maintenance. 
Maintenance costs and expenditures are often more decentralized than 
construction. For instance, Local Governments may be charged with paying for 
and carrying out maintenance; school grants may be used to allow school-level 
maintenance, and contributions may be sought or required from community 
members and/or parents. Unfortunately, it is common practice to decentralize 
responsibility for maintenance to local governments without the 
corresponding funds or potential sources of local revenue.  This is of course 
true for other types of expenditure, but maintenance is the one that most 
impacts the value of school construction and the accumulated capital assets.  In 
addition, maintenance falls under both recurrent and capital expenditure. 
Major maintenance is a capital expenditure while minor maintenance is a 
recurrent expense with direct impact on the capital asset.  
 
6. Ex-Post Evaluation: This would include both a variety of audits to verify fiscal 
comity and structural integrity, as well as evaluations that determine if schools 
are properly designed to support educational goals, construction is of high 
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quality and standing the test of time, and school location procedures accurately 
reflect actual demand for schools.   
 
Appendix 3 provides a worksheet for planners and policy analysts to consider how 
the components of education infrastructure investment and provision are and could 
be allocated across different levels of government 
 
It is instructive to consider how one might relate the above six “phases” with the 
“usual” 8 steps of any investment cycle developed considerably throughout this 
book (Figure 3).  The clearest conclusion is that they do not “align” in any straight-
forward manner. For instance school location decisions are made to a varying 
degree across the first 4 cycle steps.  In fact, even maintenance, which is primarily 
performed as part of the Service Delivery, must be factored in during the first four 
steps of project development and design. This means that planners and 
policymakers must consider the relationship of each phase with each cycle step. One 
could imagine, for instance, a 6 x 8 matrix with 48 cells each detailing the role of a 
particular educational infrastructure phase to a key cycle step, and that there could 
be considerable variation across countries and individual project. (See Appendix 4 
for a “worksheet” for planners to consider Add to this the need to consider the 
nature and extent of decentralization for each phase and cycle step, and this 
underscores the complexity of the decision-making process and the different 
entities involved! 
 
As we discuss further below, it is particularly in the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th steps where 
many governments exhibit high degrees of centralization and where consideration 
of some additional form of decentralization is likely warranted. There are multiple 
agencies involved in a complex investment cycle—this complicates considerably 
fostering accountability.  The next section explores some of the main organizational 
arrangements for infrastructure provision under a range of different kinds of 
decentralized governance and accountability arrangements. 
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A taxonomy of school construction and decentralization11 
 
As discussed above, historically in most countries the central government controlled 
and implemented virtually the entire school design, location, construction, and 
provision of non-infrastructure durable goods processes—particularly during 
periods of rapid expansion—and there is considerable international evidence that 
this resulted in poor quality and high costs. (Regional government provision fared 
little better.)  In particular, the problems were: “(i) inadequate classroom allocation, 
(ii) weak monitoring capacity of the implementation agency, and (iii) low 
construction quality.” More decentralized arrangements (especially with 
municipalities) have been more common for routine maintenance and less often for 
major rehabilitation. The past two decades have seen considerable experimentation 
with various forms of decentralization in the school infrastructure sector beyond 
basic maintenance, with some positive results. The most common decentralization 
experiences have experimented with various forms of institutional arrangements –
both devolution and delegation from both the central and sub-national governments 
to various quasi-governmental and non-governmental organization (as detailed 
                                                        
11 This section draws heavily upon Serge Theunynck (2002), “School Construction in Developing 
Countries: What do we know?” Washington, DC: World Bank. Unless otherwise indicated, all citations 
in this section are to this source. Readers interested in project by project detail will benefit greatly 
from this paper. 
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below). Of course, delegation in and of itself will only have positive impacts if there 
is accountability; that is, that the principal-agent relationships are built upon proper 
incentives, good information and transparency (among other key factors).12 Here we 
outline the most common and/or promising institutional relationships associated 
with education infrastructure decentralization.13  
 
 Devolution to local governments, which was expected to improve “site 
monitoring by local government engineers” as well as “(i) closer monitoring 
leading to better work quality, (ii) local bidding, with increased use of local 
labor, lower costs and heightened community ownership leading to a greater 
commitment to maintenance, (iii) better integration of municipal investment 
between sectors.” Little cost savings or other gains were realized in Africa, Asia 
and Latin America—with the exception of Mexico’s 1994 major decentralization 
effort where substantial unit costs savings came rapidly. 
  
 Community-based approaches have also taken many different forms and so it is 
not possible to say that they have worked or not without contextualizing the 
particular reform approach for any given country in any given time period. For 
instance, when coupled with centralized procurement—justified because of 
economies of scale and/or prefabricated design—results have been poor due to 
the complexity of supply chain and construction arrangements, failure to make 
best use of local knowledge and labor, etc. More positive results accrued to 
demand-driven approaches in Mauritania, Mali, Malawi, Uganda,14 India, and 
Mexico. These successful community-based construction strategies shared key 
characteristics: “(i) only locally available materials are used, (ii) only 
construction techniques familiar to villagers and local craftsmen and contractors 
are used, (iii) design improvements are limited to those necessary to ensure 
standard durability and safety, (iv) duties and responsibilities of partners are 
well defined. Regular technical supervision will help in ensuring that quality 
standards of construction are met, but does not substitute to close monitoring by 
communities…. Community pride in ownership of a well-built school, combined 
with appropriate technical advice to local builder is the main factor of quality 
                                                        
12 There is a large literature on accountability, in particular stemming from the WDR 2004. See 
Gershberg, Gonzalez, and Meade (2012) for a detailed exploration of the myriad potential 
relationships between principals, agents, and clients.  
13 We cannot provide details on the specific accountability relationships in the many projects 
considered in the development of this taxonomy, but it stands to reason that the instances that were 
successful effectively created incentives by which the “delegates” were answerable to the 
stakeholders responsible for service provision. While beyond the scope of this discussion, see 
Appendix for a detailed summary of all potential elements. 
14 Theunynck (2009) calls Uganda’s  community driven development (CDD) approach “the most 
important single construction program ever executed in an African country for primary classroom 
and sanitation in schools,” having built in 4 years 21,000 classrooms,  20,000 latrines, 325,000 desks, 
and 556 teacher houses.  
 
16 International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series 
 
 
construction.”15  
  
 Delegation to NGOs has sought to leverage the closer connections and trust some 
organizations have developed with disadvantaged populations. It has taken 
many forms and yielded some positive, if mixed, results. Some build their own 
schools, which are often lower cost—in some cases because they have fewer 
requirements for non-classroom facilities that government schools, or they may 
have looser construction standards or more flexibility in bidding out to 
contractors. It may also be that the schools are lower quality in some cases, but 
there is not systematic evidence to that effect.  (See example of CARE schools in 
the Egypt case study). The challenge has generally been scalability.  
 
 Delegation to Contract Management Agencies (CMAs) has proven successful both 
in terms of unit costs and project completion, particularly in Africa. CMAs are 
“given operation autonomy to implement large-scale small construction 
programs, to be carried out by small contractors with local labor. They are 
staffed with skilled professionals recruited from the private sector. They select, 
pay and supervise contractors and architectural/ engineering services for site 
supervision. Their mandate is to promote small and medium enterprises (SME) 
by allowing them to bid for contracts. These agencies have changed the ‘rules of 
the game’ and have contributed to the growth of the construction industry.” The 
initial experiments with CMAs focused on urban areas, spreading to rural areas 
after they had established their value. Nevertheless, there are to date still more 
successful urban examples.16 
 
The use of Public Private Partnerships (PPP) for school construction is an 
analogous policy to the delegations to CMAs. 
 
 Social Funds have played an important role in decentralized school construction 
often delivering lower unit costs and higher rates of project completion. 
Originally a strategy for short term employment in times of crises, social 
investment funds have gradually become more permanent fixtures, often acting 
as CMAs for their own school construction projects. While most are not 
community-based they do always call for some significant level of community 
participation and/or involvement of sub-national governments.  
 
Figures  4 and 5 show the relationships between two spectrums of centralized and 
decentralized actors as well as public and private actors for two of these categories 
                                                        
15 In our Egypt case study below we will also explore the potential for community-based approaches 
in school design and location. 
16 And delegation to CMAs is fraught with challenges of its own.  If they are, for insance, under-
capitalized when given contracts, without sufficient allowance for advances and cash flow 
management (partly out of fear for providing too many advances ahead of results), then there is a 
danger that they could fail and abandon the projects anyway. Balancing the need for cash-flow 
advances with the need for payment-for-results, with under-capitalized builders, is a factor not 
sufficiently considered in many cases. 
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of institutional arrangements a typical local government delegation and social fund 
or CMA arrangement, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
Figure 4: Devolution to local 
government  
Source, Theunynck (2009) 
 
Figure 5: Delegation to CMA 
using a Social fund, after 
delegation to local 
government  
Source, Theunynck (2009) 
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It is important to emphasize that these figures only highlight one of many potential 
examples of the institutional arrangements for only two of the categories in the 
taxonomy above. The possible combinations are myriad and many more are 
explored in greater detail in Theunynck (2009). In addition, Appendix 2 provides a 
summary of implementation schemes that allows analysts to  construct similar 
flowcharts for any given set of arrangements either existing or proposed. 
 
Table 3 provides some comparisons of cost differences of the different approaches 
from Sub-Saharan Africa. Though care should be taken in the comparisons given the 
caveat that quality cannot be compared or assumed constant, the various delegation 
models from the above taxonomy do appear to provide significant cost savings. 
 
Table 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case Study of a Large, Centralized School Construction Operation: Egypt’s General 
Authority for Educational Buildings (GAEB)17 
 
Few would deny that Egypt’s achievements in school construction have been 
impressive, even historic.  Between 1992 and 2006 the Government built about 
14,000 schools, most by the General Authority for Educational Buildings (GAEB), 
thus greatly expanding access to and enrolment in basic education especially for the 
poorest half of the income distribution.  By some accounts, more schools were built 
                                                        
17 This case study is based upon a study the author did for the Population Council and USAID 
(Gershberg and Gohary, 2007). This study used qualitative interview and focus group methods to 
gather the interview data presented here. 
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in this period than in the preceding 110 years.18  Thus, the centralized approach 
made sense at these earlier stages of educational development, especially after a 
severe earthquake required swift rebuilding of infrastructure and inspired highly 
restrictive building codes. 
 
Yet there is a wide-spread impression that school construction in Egypt is also too 
expensive for the quality of service provided—inefficient both in the cost of 
construction and in the match between the structures built and the needs of 
stakeholders—and that these inefficiencies are in no small part due to centralization 
of the design, planning and construction processes in GAEB. In particular, this case 
sheds light on the issue of school location, community involvement and 
decentralization. 
 
There are lower cost models of school construction, most interestingly from the arm 
of the government providing religious schools (Al-Azhar), which are about 33% less 
expensive on a per classroom basis.19 While officially part of the central 
government, these schools are not run by the Ministry of Education nor are the 
schools built by GAEB. For its part, GAEB claims that the Al-Azhar schools are of 
lower quality, particularly with respect to earthquake risk, an assertion that is hard 
to refute in the absence of major earthquakes.  
 
The NGO-built CARE schools also have lower unit costs (about 22% less costly), in 
part through focusing more tightly on classroom rather than on non-class room 
construction.  Additional inefficiencies stem from several pervasive problems with 
the incentive environment for educational infrastructure provision: 
 
The agency in charge of school construction and contracting (GAEB) also plans, 
proposes, and decides the type and quantity of schools needed.  
 
 This creates a conflict of interest—the larger the investment amount, the 
greater the contracting function). 
 Despite claims of high-tech mapping and school location and demand models, 
GAEB has shown poor population forecasting, in part because 
o The agency in charge of school construction & contracting also 
forecasts population growth to determine needs 
o The same agency decides the type, quantity and locations of schools 
required.  
o This creates a conflict of interest—the greater the estimated needs, 
the larger the contracting function. 
 
                                                        
18MOE, National Strategic Education Plan 2007/08 – 2011/12. This figure may also include schools 
built by donors and NGOs whose construction was overseen by and coordinated with the MOE and 
GAEB. 
19 These figures come of the World Bank Public Expenditure Review (World Bank, 2005). 
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While never a singular solution, decentralization of some form would likely mitigate 
some of GAEB’s biggest challenges. For instance, one of the major issues included 
building schools where they were not needed but where the price of land was low 
(or could be acquired for free), which led to providing schools where existing 
crowding did not demand it, and leaving crowded schools just as crowded.  This is a 
function of an accountability that emphasizes the number of schools built, and not 
the satisfaction of parents and communities with the schools.  Historically this might 
have not been so problematic, as low-population-density areas tended to be those 
with lower enrollment rates. But as enrollment became nearly universal, the 
problems of overcrowding became more significant than the problems of non-
coverage, and the areas with over-crowding tended to be those with the more 
expensive land. Almost by definition, jurisdictions with cheaper land tended to be 
those that where schools were less over-crowded.  
 
So not only was the system centralized, but it did not allocate resources in a rational 
way.  If the system was somewhat decentralized, and had to allocate construction 
according to some transparent criteria, the strangeness of allocating funding to 
areas with cheap land would become clearer, and the system would find itself 
pressured to allocate more money to areas with overcrowding. 
 
In part driven by the exposure of inefficiencies in GAEB, the Egyptian Government 
undertook a highly public program to bring the private sector into the school 
construction game through Public Private Partnerships (PPP). In theory PPPs can 
leverage private sector access to capital markets where bond markets are less 
robust. Unfortunately PPP has not been successful in Egypt for several reasons, chief 
among them that  the private sector needs even larger scale contracts to make bids 
worthwhile, and these have proven untenable given the risk involved with have to 
trust in 10-15 year relationship with Egyptian Government. The events of the Arab 
Spring have perhaps born out those risks. The end result is that GAEB ended up 
being the contractor for most of the PPP bidders! 
 
Still, decentralizing GAEB in other ways has been part of the government’s reform 
rhetoric for nearly a decade. Yet progress has been very slow. In part, the lack of 
reform stems from a political economy that generates strong incentives to remain 
centralized. . GAEB has operated as a nearly autonomous unit run by military 
generals  allocating vast sums of resources. Decentralization signifies a major loss of 
power for these stakeholders.  On the other hand, the case shows that under most 
conditions educational infrastructure decentralization is likely to be a long, complex, 
hard slog. A few capital investment and maintenance responsibilities have indeed 
been transferred to the regional (governorate) level of the MOE and/or GAEB—
known as the “muderiyas.” A couple of examples are the purchase and installation of 
educational technology in new buildings along with major maintenance funding at 
technical schools.  While schools now receive  control over some minor maintenance 
funds. Whether such developments are stepping stones towards more significant 
reform is hard to tell. Since the transition to the government lead by Mohammed 
Morsi after the fall of Hosni Mubarek, the GAEB has its first civilian director. 
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IN 2010, a major consultancy through USAID argued to the Egyptian government 
that national conditions… 
 
…call for a system where infrastructural needs are identified locally at the Idara [district] 
level, vetted and approved for funding at the Markaz [regional] level by Local Popular 
Councils (LPCs) via ear-marked decentralized fiscal transfers, and coordinated sub-
nationally at the governorate level as part of the governor’s portfolio where he ensures that 
MoE’s strategy and directions are followed and implemented, and where tradeoffs between 
idaras are assessed and decided (following nationally-set criteria). To induce local entities to 
choose efficiently within the construction envelope, the Idara must keep its own formula-
given money if it can carry out savings.  The idara (perhaps as mediated by the mudiriya) 
should also act as a client and commission the services of the local GAEB governorate 
office to act as a project manager for the Idara as a client. Distribution of funds may, at least 
in the beginning, be based on a formula or formula-like mechanism that takes specific local 
access needs into account, perhaps along with the human development index (HDI) of an 
Idara. This combination may allow for the use of valid indicators that can be specific enough 
for MoE to gauge infrastructure earmarking.
20 
 
This is similar to proposals in a 2007 strategic plan and a 2005 World Bank Public 
Expenditure Review.  The point is not that there is not change, but that it is slow and 
highly political.  
 
Table 4 revisits the decentralization matrix presented above (Table 1) and explores 
the potential application to our Egyptian school construction case study. We explain 
the manner in which each aspect of decentralization is (or more importantly could or 
should be) present in reform efforts.21 
 
Perhaps the most important point to highlight is that most of the aspects are present 
de facto to some extent and all are relevant. That is, it is not fruitful to provide a 
single label for the decentralization reforms of Egyptian school construction and the 
reality is that it is a complex mix of many components—some weakly decentralized 
and other less so.  The analysis also indicates the absence of the “stronger,” more 
“bottom up,” more “local” decentralization that many analysts have hypothesized 
are more likely to improve accountability. Below we present briefly the results of 
qualitative analysis with local stakeholders that puts some meat on the bone of this 
framework and the inefficiencies that remain, at least in part, due to the continued 
strong centralization of the institutions and the fact that the most prominent 
decentralization components are what we labeled “vertical,” which we argued are 
less likely to yield positive outcomes and foster accountability than more 
“horizontal” decentralization. 
                                                        
20 RTI, Planning the Decentralization of School Infrastructure, Discussion Document 9-2-2010 
21 Note that we do not attempt to disentangle the de facto reality of actual practice, which is quite 
often weaker than de jure. De facto practice is, of course, more important with respect to fostering the 
actual accountability gains reforms hope to accrue from decentralization, but uncovering that is 
beyond the scope of this case study 
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Table 4: Potential application of Decentralization Matrix to Egyptian School 
Construction Case 
Decentralization 
Component 
Issues and likely application to GAEB and 
Egyptian Case 
Deconcentration to 
Regional Government 
Offices and Regional MOE 
Offices 
At the governorate level, GAEB has offices that have 
traditionally been involved as implementers of 
central plans under tight control. Some increase in 
autonomy has been announced by GAEB and will 
certainly be needed 
Devolution to regional or 
local governments 
Governorates are supposed to provide input into 
plans, fiscal allocations, and project implementation. 
Pilot projects have shown promise (especially 
regarding maintenance, ICTand some vocational 
classrooms) but also the difficulty of GAEB ceding 
real control. Recognition of need to involve local 
governments but very little (and/or very 
problematic) in practice 
Delegation (and/or 
Devolution) to schools 
and/or school councils 
School councils (Boards of Trustees) established at 
many schools officially, many do not operate in 
practice or have significant power. In any case, even 
in de jure terms, the powers and duties of the 
Boards of Trustees were not always clear (they 
were not fully specified and yet non-overlapping 
with the powers and duties of other bodies) though 
the regulations on this aspect did improve in the 
late 2000s. Some control over some maintenance 
projects, none over major renovation. 
Delegation to NGOs, 
Contract Management 
Agencies (CMAs) and/or 
Social Funds 
In theory, this practice could prove fruitful, but has 
not been tried in a strict sense. Public Private 
Partnership (PPP) garnered much attention in the 
early 2000s but was largely unsuccessful for many 
reasons. 
Implicit delegation to 
community schools and 
community based 
approaches 
Virtually no input from communities on crucial 
issue of new school location and construction. Very 
much needed in future. 
 
 
In addition to high unit costs for school construction, there are several other 
“typical” inefficiencies evident in the Egyptian case study of GAEB relating to school 
design and school location that appear to imply potential reasons for some 
decentralization. For instance,  
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 There is often no differentiation in design between urban and rural areas, 
high population density or remote areas, between high-risk earthquake 
zones and lower risk etc.  
 
Not surprisingly, thus, many schools have inappropriate designs for local conditions 
and local people 
 
In short, there is simply no way that a central bureaucracy—even armed with 
remote sensing, GIS, and the best population projections available—can collect, in a 
cost effective manner, the data necessary to make the best decisions regarding 
school location to avoid such hazards.  A few excerpts from interviews of 
stakeholders exemplify the concerns of school administrators and community 
members alike (See Box). Clearly local knowledge of parents and school staff should 
be solicited and given serious consideration in school location decisions. The same 
is likely true for other aspects of school construction. 
 
 
BOX: Stakeholder Insights on School Location in Egypt 
 
(Gershberg and Gohary, 2007) examined issues with school location for the Population Council 
and USAID. They used qualitative interview and focus group methods to gather the 
impressions and insights of local actors (parents, school directors, and teachers) regarding 
school location. Here is a selection of direct quotations from the interview and focus group 
data. Allowing the voices of the stakeholders to emerge lends power and substance to many of 
the key arguments developed through our case study..  
 
"If the land is government-owned, they build wherever they like; if the inhabitants donated the 
land, they build on it".  
 
"No-one consulted us. The land is owned by the government, and they decided to build a 
school there”.  
 
"They don't ask anyone's opinion. If the Ministry cared enough to ask, some problems would 
be avoided, such as the unsavory social environment around the school”  
 
"The students come a long way, and they have to walk on the main road, where there are 
vehicles driven by young kids, many of whom don't have a driver's license. The girls leave 
school in the evening shift at 5 or 6 p.m., and they walk a long way in the fields alone."  
  
"Some students walk five or six kilometers to get to school."  
  
"It's completely inappropriate that we're directly on the road; it's the Agricultural Highway. 
Most of the kids come from the same three or four villages, which causes a drop out problem 
because the school is far away from where the kids live” 
  
"There are three or four road accidents annually... In the fields there are kidnappers, because 
the school is far away from the pupils' homes. Last year a student was kidnapped... The kids 
also walk across the canals by balancing on drainage pipes, so naturally there's a risk of falling 
in”. 
  
"It's very hard to get to school. We walk five routes, all of which are very dangerous”.  
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Concluding remarks 
 
Perhaps the simplest but very important point is that while a typology of school 
construction decentralization is useful for identifying the components of a reform 
and exploring which components are more (or less) likely to enhance accountability, 
classifying or labeling a complex decentralization reform into a “type” is not 
particularly fruitful. In fact most country contexts will exhibit some degree of 
decentralization along most if not all of the potential components of a reform.  
 
One important point to take from the Egypt case, that we argue may generalize to 
other cases, is that when the main issue is massive out-of-school numbers, 
governments can put a school anywhere, even with overly-centralized and standard 
design, and, assuming that out-of-school problems are mostly supply-side issues, 
then students will fill the new schools. But as countries have progressed, at least 
three things have happened.  
 
i. First, in some areas schools are over-crowded, and then the decision to add 
more spaces by adding to schools, by buying expensive but close-by land to 
build new ones, etc requires more subtle, localized information and 
interaction; therefore such progress appears to strengthen the case for some 
decentralization.  
ii. Second, as countries put most of the children into school, the ones that 
remain out of school are increasingly special, harder to reach and serve 
populations—the extreme poor and disenfranchised, the disabled, nomadic 
families, populations with different cultures (ethnic or linguistic 
minorities)—whose needs are often best met with special-purpose 
infrastructure.   
  
iii. Third, the more infrastructure has been built in the past, the more there is a 
need for the recurrent cost of maintenance, by definition, and maintenance is 
often best done locally, since a central location has a hard time deciding in 
which local school to fix broken windows and in which local schools to paint 
the walls, or fix the bathrooms. This is to argue that, as countries have 
advanced, the arguments favoring some form of decentralization, as outlined 
in Table 2 above, increase. However, this leaves each country with a very 
important and very difficult set of institutional incentives and arrangements 
to ensure accountability: namely, when school construction is centralized 
and school operations and maintenance decentralized, what are the right 
institutional arrangements for giving decentralized governments the right 
incentives to keep building maintenance at the right level?  
 
In addition, our discussion highlights important factors for policymakers to consider 
when contemplating decentralization and intergovernmental relations in 
educational infrastructure provision  
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 While Sub-national governments are often the focus of infrastructure 
decentralization reforms, they are only one among a long list of other entities 
and stakeholders involved. On the one hand, this means at least very 
carefully thinking through the inter-institutional relationships and 
environment within which sub-national governments operate. On the other 
hand, it could mean that under some conditions  sub-national government 
need not be the central focus of any given reform in any given country 
context.   
 
 Our discussion also illustrates clearly how imperative it is to consider and 
explore how conditions and opportunities change over time, and that it is a 
very different task to provide for infrastructure where the out-of-school 
population is 30% versus 3%--the latter case often favoring decentralization 
for various reasons explored above.   The mix of conditions and effective 
components of a school infrastructure decentralization strategy is obviously 
quite different in Egypt compared to Niger, and in Egypt in 1990 compared to 
Egypt in 2010. This latter evolution presents a challenge for decentralization 
policies in that institutions (especially strong centralized, school construction 
authorities) almost by definition resist change and are slow to decentralize 
(at best). 
  
 Planning and Appraisal, especially location and design features are two areas  
where the role of local government and communities may be particularly 
important and particularly difficult to achieve 
 
 Financing and Procurement: while there is no generalizable formula for 
successful improvement, it is clear that  
 
o this area offers big potential costs and cost savings: various 
decentralized strategies appear to lower costs and foster 
accountability, efficiency and effectiveness (and provide likely 
political gains, too) 
o “earmarking” and other fixed or formula-driven costs (recurrent and 
capital) associated with construction are strategies worth considering 
o equalization transfers or other redistributive fiscal transfers are key 
to enhancing equity. And, it is important to consider how to include 
maintenance and infrastructure expenditures into these transfers 
 
 Community-based approaches, Intermediary NGOs, Social Funds, and 
Contract Management Agencies (CMAs) all hold promise for accountability 
and performance enhancement across many of the key phases of the 
infrastructure planning and school construction—as does the use of  medium 
and sometimes small scale contractors. 
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 There is likely a need for a continued strong role at the central level in school 
design and standards, even while there are many reasons why in reality this 
may foster inefficiencies. As in any decentralization effort, it’s crucial that the 
center set the “rules of the game” clearly and enforce them consistently and 
transparently 
 
 There is not nearly enough attention to evaluating the potential and actual 
impact of decentralization reforms on cost and other key aspects of 
construction programs.  And there is hardly any ex-post evaluation of the 
actual performance of school buildings as an input to either attendance or 
learning. 
 
We believe the discussion in this paper has made clear that various fiscal levers and 
institutional arrangements can often be applied to achieve better implementation. 
However, without equal attention to the critical issues of school design and location 
also highlighted in this paper, the dilemma is the risk that a country better 
implements poorly designed schools. To avoid this paradox some parallel 
application of organizational models we have explored are justified and are 
warranted. This type of organizational asymmetry holds promise for improved 
efficiency for decentralized education infrastructure. 
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Annex 1: Application of OECD’s locus of decision-making framework to examine the 
range of centralization and decentralization in a sample of countries 
 
Table A1 shows the level of governmental authority responsible for three relevant 
decisions: 1) the allocation of capital expenditure resources to schools, 2) the 
decision over how schools use those resources, and 3) the decision to create or close 
a school, which impacts school construction and location.22 The table also shows the 
relative autonomy that governmental authority has over the decision (in full 
autonomy versus being required to consult with another governmental level to 
make the decision23). 
 
Table A1. source: Author adaptation of OECD Education at a Glance 2012. 
 
                                                        
22 Unfortunately, the first two relate only to capital investment at already constructed schools and the 
third is only the broadest decision related to the issue of school location for new construction and the 
potential re-use of existing infrastructure. It would be very useful in future if OECD could expand the 
questions on capital investment  in their survey to cover school design, location, and construction. 
23 “Other” means the authority over decision-making cannot be categorized by either of these two 
descriptions 
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Annex 2 from Theunyck (2009) 
1 
Appendix 3: Worksheet for Educational Infrastructure Provision and Reform 
 
 Central Regional Local 
 Central 
Ministry 
Central 
Construction 
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Other 
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Regional 
deconcentrated 
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Regional 
government 
Municipal 
Govern-
ment 
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School-
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School Design 
 
 
        
School Location 
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Construction,  
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School 
Construction, 
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existing school 
        
Provision of Non-
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Evaluation 
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Appendix 3: Worksheet for Educational Infrastructure Provision and Reform 
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